第52章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (46)

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惡魔總裁太溫柔 肥田仁醫傻包子 逍遙小相師 地獄王座 巖武天尊 仙影飄渺 當個後媽不容易 一等悍妃:太子是匹狼 鳳殿 帝師傳奇

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第52章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (46)

)/rportionofrentwereassignedexclusivelytoanindividualtenant(ortenants),say,throughtheissuanceofstocksagainstthemarketvalueofthegivenland,jointownershipofthelandwouldbeestablished.Withtheentirereturntotheownershiprightassignedtoprivateparties,eachjointownerwouldtherebybegrantedauthoritytomakedecisionsconcerninghisshareoftheresource.Withtherighttoderivetherentfromlandwhollyexclusiveorunattenuated,therighttousetheresourceisalsowhollyexclusive.Variousformsoftransferswouldinsurethatthevalueofeachsharebedeterminedinthemarket.Theimpliedresourceusewouldthereforebeexactlythesameasbeforethesharerestriction.Theimplicationisthattheinefficientallocationofresourcesundertherentalpercentagerestrictionliesnotinthelandowner'ssharebeingreduced,butinthattherighttoderiveinefromlandisnotwhollyexclusivelyassigned.Inotherwords,underthesharerestrictioninTaiwan,therighttolandownershipwasnolongerwhollyexclusive.

Letmecarrythisargumentfurther.Underthesharerestriction,itwillberecalled,themarginalproductoftenantlaborfallsandthemarginalproductoflandrises.Butaslongastherentalpercentageisgreaterthanzero,themarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegative.(Thisisimpliedbythemaximizingbehaviorofthelandownerundertheaddedshareconstraint.)Supposeboththerentalpercentageandthenonpecuniarybene-

fitsofowninglandareeffectivelyreducedtozero;thatis,privatelandownershipisreducedtoameretitle,devoidofanyformofine.Returnmomentarilytofigure7;petitionamongtenantswillpushlaborinputtopointk,wherethewagerateequalstheaverageproductoflabor,orwheretheentireunassignedinefromlandisexhausted.Dependingontheproductionfunctionandthewagerate,themarginalproductoflaborinthiscasemaybenegative.[2]Thatistosay,iftheentireinefromlandisunassignedtoanyindividualorprivateparty,landbeesamonpropertyresource(inourcase,withaprivatetitle),andpetitionamongusersimpliesthatnonlandresourceswillbeallocatedtolanduntiltheinetoland(rent)iszero.[3]

Fromtheabovediscussionwemaygeneralize:Foranyproductionfunctionrequiringresourceinputshandt,iftherighttoaportionoftheinefromh,howeversmall,isnotappropriatedorexclusivelyassigned,theratiot/hwillriseunderpetition,implyingafallinthemarginalproductoftandariseinthemarginalproductofh;astheunassignedinefromhincreases,themarginalproductoftwillaccordinglybelower,andmaybeenegativewhentheentireinefromhisnotassignedtoanyindividualparty.Wemaycallthis"theproductiontheoremofpropertyrightassignment."

[1].Thisshouldbedistinguishedfromaninetax,wherethetaxreceiptisappropriatedbythegovernment.Asimpliedinthefollowingdiscussion,themisallocationgeneratedbyataxonresourceusestemsnotfromthetaxitself,butfromthefactthatnogovernmentofficialistherebygrantedauthoritytomakedecisionsonresourceuse.

[2].Inthisandmyearlierstatementthatthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegativeif

isgreaterthanzero,theargumentwouldperhapsbemoreconvincingifthemarginalproductoflaborintherelevantrangewerealwayspositive,sothatwhen

=0itisstillpositive(withthewagerateequalingtheaverageproductoflabor).Inthiscasetheincreasesintenantinputwillbegradualandcontinuousinresponsetogradualdecreasesof.

Theoreticallythepossibilityoftheexistenceofsubzeromarginalproductoflaborrequiresnotonly

=0,butalsothesuppositionthatthetitleholdercannotdenytenantfarmingonapetitivebasis.

[3].Withasomewhatdifferentapproach,thisconditionisreachedinH.ScottGordon,"TheEconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy(August,1954).AnditisimplicitinProfessorPigou'simaginativeexampleoftworoads,whichisexpoundedbyProfessorKnight.SeeA.C.Pigou,TheEconomicsofWelfare(London:Macmillan,＆Co.,1920),p.194;andF.H.Knight,"SomeFallaciesintheInterpretationofSocialCost,"QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol.38(1924).

Thecorrectanalysisexplainingthedissipationofrent,tomymind,isanalogoustoCournot'sduopolysolutionwithfreeentry:withrentalinereplacingmonopolyrent,theaggregateaverageproductoflaborreplacingmarketdemandforproduct,andapositivewageinsteadofazerocostofproduction.

7.EvidenceofInputAdjustmentsundertheShareRestriction

Theeffectsonresourcereallocationunderthesharerestrictionasimpliedbythetheoryofsharetenancycanbesummarizedasfollows.Theimpositionofamaximumrentalpercentagerestrainsthemarket-determinedrentalpercentage.Intheabsenceofsufficientpensatingpaymentsandtenurerearrangementsthroughwhichtheinitialresourceusemayberestored,thetenantswouldrecieveearningsfromfarminginexcessoftheiralternativeopportunities;butpetitionamongtenantsofferingtoincreasenonlandfarminginputseliminatestheresidualearnings(unlessthemarginalproductofnonlandinputsgoestozero).Undereffectivesharerestriction,emphasiswillbeplacedmoreonthemaximizationofgrosscropvaluethanonthecropvaluenetofnonlandcosts.Theyieldperacreoflandwillrise,andwithalowerrentalpercentagethelandowner'srentalinewillbepartiallyrestoredbyahigheroutput.